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The cross-appeal involves three straightforward questions:
1.

Is Investor Recovery Fund's lawsuit one to recover in commercial transactions

within the meaning of I.C. § 12-120(3)?
If so, are defendants Randy Hopkins, Brian Murphy and Hopkins Financial

2.

Services, Inc. (collectively, the "Hopkins Associates") entitled to recover their attorney's fees
under section 12-120(3) even though they were not parties to the contracts that underlay the
transactions?
3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in cutting the Hopkins Associates'

attorney's fees in half on the basis of its cursory, inaccurate analysis?
The answers are likewise straightforward: Yes; Yes; and Yes.

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

First, this Court must decide whether the Individual Investors' 1 substantial investments of
cash into a pooled investment fund managed by professionals constitutes a "commercial
transaction" or a transaction for "personal or household purposes." Second, if such investments
do constitute commercial transactions, are fees awardable only when the transacting parties
themselves are litigating, or is it sufficient that a transacting party's agents are the litigants?
An informed analysis of this Court's case law provides obvious answers to these
questions.
This lawsuit involves a commercial transaction because the Individual Investors invested
in the fund to generate income for themselves.

1

The "Individual Investors" were the persons who originally invested in the Hopkins Northwest
Fund, L.L.C. and then assigned their fraud claims to plaintiff Investor Recovery Fund, LLC
("Investor Recovery").
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And the fact that the Hopkins Associates did not transact directly with the plaintiff's
assignors is irrelevant. In two opinions, this Court has squarely held that where an individual
engaged in a commercial transaction with a business, and the individual alleged that the
business's agent engaged in fraud in connection with the transaction, this Court awarded the
prevailing party its attorney's fees under section 12-120(3).
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Conducting its Free Review, this Court Should Find that Investor Recovery's Entire
Civil Action is One to Recover in a Commercial Transaction within the Meaning of
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3).

1.

The District Court's One-Third/Two-Thirds Allocation Cannot Stand.

The district court ruled that one-third of the Hopkins Associates' fees satisfied the
"commercial transactions" requirement of section 12-120(3) but two-thirds did not. Both sides
of the lawsuit appealed this ruling.
The parties' briefs confirm they agree that the district court's cryptic split-the-baby
conclusion constituted reversible error. In its Cross-Appellants' Brief, at 52-54, the Hopkins
Associates argued that the district court's one-third/two-thirds allocation was completely
arbitrary and without foundation.
Investor Recover does not spend a single word in its Reply Brief trying to explain or
justify the district court's one-third/two-thirds allocation. Investor Recovery agrees that the
district court's allocation was "incorrect." Appellant's Reply Br. at 20.
2.

The Individual Investors' Investment in the Fund Was for Commercial Purposes.
a.

Investor Recovery Has Offered Two Theories to Escape the Reach of
Section 12-120(3).

Cognizant of the risk, Investor Recovery's assignors-the Individual Investorscollectively invested $1.4 million of disposable income in Hopkins Northwest Fund, L.L.C. (the
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"fund"), which had historically earned very high returns. The Hopkins Associates contend this
was a commercial transaction. Investor Recovery disagrees.
Investor Recovery has made two distinct arguments.
In its opening brief, Investor Recovery, in reliance on Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152
Idaho 741,274 P.3d 1256 (2012), argued that the Court should find that the Individual Investors
had no commercial objective. The investments were for "personal purposes," such as the
construction of a house. Appellant's Br. at 41-42.
In its Reply Brief, Investor Recovery changes tack. It now argues that section 12120(3)'s focus on commerce requires that the litigant have been "[a]ctively engaging in
commerce, i.e. proactively participating in a business." Appellant's Reply Br. at 19. Investor
Recovery contrasts an "active[]" or "proactive[]" investment, which mandates an award under
section 12-120(3), with a passive investment, which does not support an award. Id. at 18-20.
Investor Recovery argues that rather than proactively engaging in commerce, the Individual
Investors were "passively" investing in a "passive savings investment[]" akin to a "savings
account .... " Investor Recovery argues that since in the investors had "no say or control in the
use of the funds," no commercial transaction within the meaning of section 12-120(3) took place.

Id. at 19-20.
b.

Investor Recovery's New Argument that Section 12-120(3) Distinguishes
between Active and Passive Investments Has No Merit.

This Court cannot consider Investor Recovery's new argument. Investor Recovery did
not raise the active/passive argument in its opening brief appealing the district court's application
of section 12-120(3). Accordingly, it cannot raise it in its reply brief. See Suitts v. Nix, 141
Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005) (Appellant cannot raise an argument for the first time
in her reply brief.)
-3-

In an abundance of caution, the Hopkins Associates will nonetheless address Investor
Recovery's new active/passive argument. It is wholly unpersuasive. Investor Recovery has
invented it out of whole cloth.
Section 12-120(3) provides that the "term 'commercial transaction' is defined to mean all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." The statute's clear focus,
then, is upon the "purpose" of the transaction, not the extent of the litigant's effort in the
transaction. Nor does any Idaho case law suggest that the level of the litigant's activeness is a
relevant factor, much less the determinative factor. Investor Recovery does not persuasively cite
to a single Idaho opinion in support of the materiality of a distinction between an active and
passive investment.
Indeed, the most relevant cases demonstrate that this supposed distinction has no
relevance. For example, the third-party plaintiffs (the Eyers) in Stevens v. Eyer undertook no

action in connection with their contract permitting a logging company to harvest timber from
their land. This Court nonetheless upheld an award of attorney's fees against them, because their
purpose was "to earn income." 161 Idaho 407,412, 387 P.3d 75, 80 (2016). That the Eyers, like
the Individual Investors here, did not engage in any activity in connection with the transaction
was completely irrelevant to the application of section 12-120(3).

Meyers v. Hansen is very similar. 148 Idaho 283, 221 P.3d 81 (2009). In Meyers, the
plaintiffs were a married couple who invested in "an investment scheme orchestrated by the
[defendant-]appellant .... " The plaintiffs "believed" they were investing in a "legitimate
attempt to build a revenue-generating program," but the defendant's purported business turned
out to be a fraud. 148 Idaho at 293,286, 221 P.3d at 91, 84. This Court upheld an award of
attorney's fees in favor of the prevailing plaintiffs. 148 Idaho at 293, 221 P.3d at 91. There is
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absolutely nothing in Meyers supporting Investor Recovery's bifurcation between active and
passive investing. That simply is not a relevant distinction. Furthermore, by contrasting
plaintiffs' "belie[f]" about their investment with the actual facts, this Court's opinion suggests
that the Meyers had no active involvement in the business in which they invested. 148 Idaho at
293, 221 P.3d at 91.
The Hopkins Associates do not disagree with Investor Recovery's contention that a
lawsuit involving a bank savings account would likely not constitute a lawsuit involving a
commercial transaction. However, as the parties' briefs demonstrate, the Individual Investors'
investments in the fund were nothing like savings accounts at a bank. A savings account is a
safe and liquid investment, federally insured, bearing very low or no interest, which a person
accesses often to manage her personal cash needs and for household purchases. The Individual
Investors' investments in the funds were higher risk and higher reward, with the goal to generate
income. The Individual Investors could access their money without penalty only upon 120 days'
written demand.
c.

Investor Recovery's Original Argument that the Transactions Were for the
Individual Investors' Personal Purposes is Unavailing.

Investor Recovery's focus on active versus passive investing is an unilluminating detour.
"This Court has previously characterized transactions as commercial when the purpose
for entering into the transaction was to generate income." Stevens, 161 Idaho at 412, 387 P.3d at
80 (citing Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214,216, 159 P.3d 851, 853 (2007)). See also Brown v.

Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 168, 335 P.3d 21, 13 (2014) (Quiet title lawsuit involved a
commercial transaction even though plaintiffs resided on a different portion of the contested land
they sold to defendants.).
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The leading cases remain Stevens v. Eyer and Meyers v. Hansen. In Stevens, the Eyers
sought to make money when they let someone cut timber on their land. In Meyers, the Meyers
sought to make money when they invested it in Hansen's supposed entrepreneurial venture.
These transactions were made by individuals for their own personal benefit to generate income.
The prevailing party won its attorney's fees in both cases. This was the case even though in

Stevens, the Eyers were planning on spending the income they hoped to realize on their own
personal medical bills. 161 Idaho at 409, n.2, 411-412, 387 P.3d at 77, n.2, 79-80. All of the
ostensibly personal details did not matter. If the litigants' purpose was to earn income, section
12-120(3) applied. Here, the Individual Investors' goal was to earn income. Cross-Appellants'

Br. at 45-47.
3.

The Hopkins Associates' Failure to Conduct an Allocation in the Trial Court is
Without Significance.

The parties to this appeal both regard allocation of the Hopkins Associates' fees between
commercial transactions and other transactions to be unnecessary. Unsurprisingly, each side
wants the attorney's fee issue to be decided 100% in its favor.
Nonetheless, in the very unlikely event that this Court concludes that some but not all of
Investor Recovery's claims involve commercial transactions, the issue of allocation will arise.
How much of the Hopkins Associates' attorney's fees should be allocated to the "commercial
transactions"? On what basis should the allocation take place?
The Hopkins Associates contend that the allocation, if necessary, should be conducted by
the district court on remand, on the basis of an instruction from this Court that the allocation
must be made on the basis of the dollar value of the transactions characterized by commercial
purposes, and the dollar value of the transactions supposedly characterized by household or
personal purposes. Cross-Appellants' Br. at 53-54.
-6-

In its Reply Brief, Investor Recovery argues instead that the Hopkins Associates have
waived their right to request an allocation, because their memorandum of costs and fees in the
trial court did not allocate. Appellant's Reply Br. at 20-21. Investor Recovery relies on Brooks

v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 77-78, 910 P.2d 744, 749-50 (1996).
Investor Recovery's argument is without merit. Gigray Ranches has no bearing on this
lawsuit.
In Gigray Ranches, the plaintiff asserted a claim for breach of a commercial contract and
the defendant asserted a tort counterclaim. Both claims arose out of the same transaction. 128
Idaho 72, 73-74, 901 P.2d 744, 745-46. The defendant prevailed. The defendant sought fees.
The district court did not award fees. The trial court held that the defendant was entitled to its
fees for defending the contract claim, but was not entitled to fees for prosecuting the tort claim.
However, the trial court ultimately ruled that because the prevailing litigant did not allocate its
fees between the claim subject to section 12-120(3) and the claim not subject to 12-120(3) in its
memorandum for fees and costs, the court lacked the information necessary to make any award
to the prevailing defendant. 128 Idaho at 77-78, 901 P.2d at 749-51. This Court affirmed.

Gigray Ranches is inapplicable here, for three reasons.
First, this Court has since rejected the central premise of the Gigray Ranches decision
that contract claims fall under section 12-120(3) but tort claims do not. Blimka v. My Web

Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728-29, 152 P.3d 594, 599-600 (2007). See also Bryan
Trucking, Inc. v. Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 374 P.3d 585 (2016) (Court awards fees in fraud case.).
If Gigray Ranches were to be decided today, the prevailing defendant/counterclaimant would
recover all of its fees. One clear indication that this would be the case is that Gigray Ranches
cited to, and relied on, Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 807 P.2d 633 (1991). 128 Idaho at 78-
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79, 901 P .2d at 750-51. In Fuller, this Court held that no fees could be awarded in a lawsuit
alleging attorney malpractice. Now, however, Idaho law is to the contrary. Ciccarello v. Davies,
_Idaho _ _, _ P.3d _ _, _ , 2019 WL 7043516 at* 8-9 (Dec. 23, 2019) (An attorney
malpractice case supports a fee award under section 12-120(3)); City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 146
Idaho 656, 664-65, 201 P.3d 629, 637-38 (2009) (same).
Second, the parties in Gigray Ranches knew they were litigating one breach of contract
claim and one intentional tort claim. The defendant could have, and should have, anticipated in
1996 that its fees on the contract claim would be recoverable under section 12-120(3) but that its
fees on the intentional tort would not be recoverable. Compare Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,
985, 342 P.3d 907, 912 (2015) ("When various statutory and common law claims are separable,
a court should bifurcate the claims and award fees pursuant to§ 12-120(3) only on the
commercial transaction."). Accordingly, the trial court and this Court appropriately held the
defendant's failure to allocate against it. 128 Idaho at 78, 79,910 P.2d at 750, 751.
Here, to the contrary, Investor Recovery's complaints asserted only tort claims. Investor
Recovery did not plead any contract claims. CR 43-64, 2048-2080. It was accordingly not
possible for the Hopkins Associates, when they filed their memorandum of costs and fees, to
have anticipated that the district court might find some of their fees to fall within section 12120(3) and some to fall without. Even Investor Recovery has not contended that the district
court's allocation is supported by Idaho law.
In the unlikely event that this Court remands to the district court for an allocation, this
Court will provide instructions on how the allocation should have been performed. The Hopkins
Associates will perform the allocation in connection with the remand.

-8-

B.

The Hopkins Associates Can Recover Their Fees Notwithstanding that Their
Participation in the Relevant Commercial Transaction Was as Agents for a
Disclosed Principal.

Investor's Recovery main argument in its Reply Brief is the same as the argument it
asserted in its Appellant's Brief-namely, that the Hopkins Associates are not entitled to fees
under section 12-120(3) because the Individual Investors did not contract directly with the
Hopkins Associates. Investor Recovery introduces two new variations on this argument in its
Reply Brief. First, it relies on a recent opinion from this Court, First Bank ofLincoln v. Land
Title ofNez Perce County, Inc., 165 Idaho 813, 452 P.2d 835 (2019), which this Court issued

since Investor Recovery filed its opening brief. Appellant's Reply Br. at 16-18. Second, Investor
Recovery, in its Appellant's Brief, tried to distinguish the key case Bryan Trucking, Inc. v. Gier,
160 Idaho 422, 374 P.3d 585 (2016). Appellant's Br. at 41. In its Reply Brief, Investor Recovery
reverses itself and now simply argues that the Court's opinion in Bryan Trucking "makes no
sense." Appellant's Reply Br. at 17.
Investor Recovery's new arguments are unavailing.
1.

This Court's Opinion in First Bank o{Lincoln Has No Applicability Here.

In its Reply Brief, Investor Recovery argues as if First Bank ofLincoln, 165 Idaho 813,
452 P.3d 835 (2019) both represents a notable development in Idaho case law and clearly
requires that this Court reverse the district court. Appellant's Reply Br. at 16-20. Neither of
these things is accurate.
In First Bank ofLincoln, a borrower (on loan 1) was itself a creditor on a different loan
(loan 2). The borrower pledged to its lender (on loan 1) a security interest in the borrower's
beneficial interest as creditor in loan 2. When there was a payoff on loan 2, borrower's escrow
agent distributed the payoff proceeds from loan 2 to the borrower, not to the lender on loan 1,
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notwithstanding the security interest. The lender on loan 1, "First Bank," sued the escrow agent,
"Land Title," because Land Title failed to distribute the loan payoff proceeds to it. 165 Idaho at
817-18, 452 P.3d at 839-40.
Land Title, the escrow agent, prevailed. This Court affirmed the trial court. 165 Idaho at
818-23, 452 P.3d at 840-45. Land Title sought its appellate attorney's fees under section 12120(3). This Court rejected Land Title's request for fees. 165 Idaho at 823-26, 452 P.3d at 84548.
First Bank ofLincoln is inapposite here. As this Court stated in its description of the

dispute, "First Bank and Land Title [i.e., the litigants] did not themselves have any relationship."
165 Idaho at 823,452 P.2d at 845 (emphasis added). This Court's opinion suggests strongly that
there was not a single communication of any form between First Bank and Land Title. First
Bank was not a party to the escrow agreement between First Bank's borrower and Land Title.
First Bank never even recorded with Land Title a collateral assignment of its borrower's escrow
account. As a result, this Court held, the parties had no commercial relationship. 165 Idaho at
823,452 P.3d at 845.
For these reasons, First Bank ofLincoln does not apply here. Here, to the contrary, the
defendants, the Hopkins Associates, were corporate agents of the party with whom the plaintiff
contracted, with all of the legal ramifications to which such an agency relationship gives rise.
The Hopkins Associates argued expressly in their Cross-Appellants' Brief, at 55-56, that Investor
Recovery on numerous occasions admitted that Randy and Brian were agents of the fund, with
whom the Individual Investors transacted. Investor Recovery did not challenge that conclusion
in its Appellant's Reply Brief. The facts in this lawsuit are the plaintiffs predecessors-ininterest (the Individual Investors) communicated often and regularly with defendants Randy and
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Brian. The latter were acting in their capacity as agents of the party with whom the Individual
Investors had transacted. There was a direct commercial relationship between the litigants
lacking in First Bank ofLincoln.
In addition to being inapposite, First Banko/Lincoln's holding regarding attorney's fees
also is unremarkable. Its holding is in no meaningful way different than the holding of this Court
in Lincoln Land Co. v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105,408 P.3d 465 (2017). Like the
litigants in First Bank ofLincoln, the litigants in Lincoln Land had a commercial dispute but
were not parties to a contract. Specifically, the plaintiff in Lincoln Land was a lessor of real
property and the defendant was the sublessee. As was the case in First Bank ofLincoln, the
defendant was not a corporate agent of the intermediate contracting party (here, the
lessee/sublessor). There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the litigants had any direct
dealings with one another. 163 Idaho at 107-08, 408 P.3d at 468-69. Accordingly, the district
court refused to award fees under section 12-120(3) and this Court affirmed. 163 Idaho at 11113, 408 P.3d at 472-74. First Bank ofLincoln and Lincoln Land stand for the exact same
principle.
2.

This Court's Opinion in Bryan Trucking is Well-Reasoned and is Controlling.

First Bank ofLincoln and Lincoln Land, on the one hand, contrast with Bryan Trucking v.
Gier, 160 Idaho 422, 374 P.3d 585 (2016) and Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283,221 P.3d 81

(2009), on the other hand. In the former cases, there was no award under section 12-120(3)
because the litigating parties had no direct commercial relationship. In the latter cases, there was
an award under section 12-120(3) because of the litigants' very close commercial relationship,
even though the plaintiff actually contracted with the individual defendant's principal, not the
individual himself. The Hopkins Associates rely on this latter pair of cases.
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The distinction between the two sets of cases is that in Bryan Trucking and Meyers, the
non-contracting party was an express agent of the contracting corporate party, and was intimately
involved in the commercial transaction with the plaintiff in that capacity. Thus, the defendant
individual, as an agent of the contracting party, became a party to the transaction sufficiently for
the purposes of section 12-120(3) in respect of the agency relationship when it acted on behalf of
the corporate principal in consummating the deal.
Bryan Trucking, Meyers and this case feature this same basic fact pattern.

In Bryan Trucking, Bryan Trucking sued Gier, an individual, for fraud in connection with
Bryan Trucking's purchase of a truck from Niel Ring Trucking, Inc. Bryan Trucking alleged
that Gier was an agent of the seller Neil Ring Trucking and played an active role in the fraud.
Gier recovered his attorney's fees from Bryan Trucking under section 12-120(3) even though
Neil Ring Trucking, not Gier himself, sold the truck. 160 Idaho at 423-24, 426-27, 374 P.3d at
586-87, 589-90.
In Meyers, the Meyers sued Hansen, an individual, for fraud in connection with the
Meyers' investment of $300,000 in Ideal Consultants, a business enterprise. This Court
expressly rejected Hansen's contention that the Meyers' advance was loan to Hansen personally.
148 Idaho at 292-93, 221 P.3d at 90-91. Although this Court did not expressly hold that Hansen
was Ideal Consultant's agent, it stated much the same thing when it noted in its opinion that
Hansen "orchestrated" the fraud but Ideal Consultants was the beneficiary of the fraud. 148
Idaho at 286,293,221 P.3d at 84, 91. The Meyers recovered their attorney's fees from Hansen
under section 12-120(3) even though Ideal Consultants, not Hansen personally, actually received
the Meyers' money. 148 Idaho at 292-93, 221 P.3d at 90-91.
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Here, Investor Recovery sued Hopkins, Murphy and Hopkins Financial for fraud in
connection with the Individual Investors' retention of securities issued by Hopkins Northwest
Fund LLC. The Individual Investors' security purchase was a commercial transaction. Supra at
5, 6. Investor Recovery alleged that the defendants were agents of Hopkins Northwest Fund, the
contracting party, and played an active role in the fraud. Supra at 10. The Hopkins Associates
are thus entitled to an award of fees under section 12-120(3).
As Investor Recovery notes in its Reply Brief at 17, the key language is the following
language from Bryan Trucking: "Although [the individual defendant] was not a named
defendant on the ... contract ... [the plaintiff] nonetheless did allege that [the individual
defendant] was a party to the commercial transaction when it alleged that [the defendant] was the
[the contracting corporation's] agent, had defrauded [plaintiff], and owed [plaintiff] a duty." 160
Idaho at 427, 374 P.3d at 590.
Just like the plaintiff in Bryan Trucking, plaintiff Investor Recovery alleged that the
defendants were agents of the contracting party, defrauded it, and owed it a duty. Thus, this
Court must hold that the Hopkins Associates are parties to the commercial transactions at issue
sufficient to trigger section 12-120(3).
Recognizing that it cannot successfully distinguish Bryan Trucking from this case, and
that this Court's application of Bryan Trucking here means it will lose, Investor Recovery
unsubtly concludes that the opinion's language quoted above "makes no sense." Appellant's

Reply Br. at 17.
In both its opening brief and its Reply Brief, 2 Investor Recovery cites to General Motors

Acceptance Corp. v. Turner Ins. Agency, 96 Idaho 691, 535 P.2d 664 (1975) in support of its

2

Appellant's Br. at 40, n.3; Appellant's Reply Br. at 17.
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argument that this Court's analysis in Bryan Trucking is flawed. In General Motors, this Court
identifies the bedrock principal that where an agent, on behalf of a disclosed principal, contracts
with a third party, it is the principal who is liable on the contract, not the agent. 96 Idaho at 69697, 535 P.2d at 669-70. Investor Recovery is arguing, then, that the fact that the principal is the
contracting party means that the agent cannot be the contracting party, thus making section 12120(3) inapplicable.
But as this Court will immediately recognize, Investor Recovery's brittle, unnuanced
reading has no relevance. There are three principal reasons for this.
First, Plaintiff is asserting tort liability against the agents, not contract liability.
Accordingly, General Motors has nothing to do with this case.
Second, insofar as tort liability is concerned, an agent's engagement in the fraud for the
principal's benefit does not preclude liability attaching to the agent. In fact, the contrary is the
case. Where an agent engages in a tortious act in his capacity as an agent, both he and the
principal are liable for the damages caused. Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,303, 796
P.2d 506,512 (1990). Accordingly, the agent's participation in the tort brings more parties into
the mix, not fewer. Although so far as Hopkins Associates can determine this Court has never
expressly cited to this principle in its section 12-120(3) jurisprudence, it is reasonable to suppose
that it nonetheless underlies the Court's analysis.
Third, Investor Recovery sees a rigidity in the application of section 12-120(3) and the
concomitant case law that is not there. If section 12-120(3) and the case law were as certain as
Investor Recovery asserts, then the case law would not have evolved over the past two decades
as it has. Since section 12-120(3) merely calls for an award of fees when a litigant asserts a
claim to recover in a commercial transaction, there is nothing about the language of the statute or
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the case law that justifies Investor Recovery's conclusion that the Bryan Trucking result is
nonsensical. See, e.g., Bryan Trucking, 160 Idaho at 427-28, 374 P.3d at 590-91 (Eismann, J.,
concurring). This Court should follow its precedent that a defendant-agent who allegedly
engages in tortious actions directed against the plaintiff in the scope of her duties for her
contracting principal is a party to a commercial transaction sufficient for application of section
12-120(3) in her favor. This seems especially clear in cases, like Bryan Trucking and here,
where the amount of the plaintiffs tort claim equals the exact amount of the plaintiffs loss on its
contract.

C.

Because Investor Recovery Does not Challenge the Vast Majority of the Hopkins
Associates' Contentions that the District Court Abused its Discretion in
Determining the Amount of the Attorney's Fees, this Court Must Remand for a
New Determination.
The Hopkins Associates have argued that the district court abused its discretion when it

found that their attorney's fees were twice has high as a reasonable amount after a cursory,
unsupported analysis. Cross-Appellants' Br. at 56-58.
Investor Recovery devotes only a few sentences to this issue. Appellant's Reply Br. at
20. Of the many points that the Hopkins Associates raised, Investor Recovery responded only to
one.
Investor Recovery did not respond to these well-founded challenges that the Hopkins
Associates raised:
•
•
•

that the district court abused its discretion in evaluating the novelty of the
questions;
that the district court abused its discretion in evaluating the difficulty of the
questions;
that the district court abused its discretion in characterizing the Hopkins
Associates' attorneys' hourly rates as too high;
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•
•

that the district court abused its discretion in cutting the fee application for
charges that were not in the fee application (trial consultant charges); and
that the district court abused its discretion in evaluating the results obtained.

Cross-Appellants' Br. at 57-58.
Because Investor Recovery did not address the Hopkins Associates' appeals on these
issues, Investor Recovery has waived its challenge to these arguments. Compare Puckett v.
Oalifabco, Inc., 132 Idaho 816, 821, 979 P.2d 1174, 1179 (1999) (where party fails to make
argument or offer authority as to an issue, he has waived the issue on appeal). This Court should
accordingly reverse and remand on all of these grounds.
The only argument that Investor Recovery offers in its Appellant's Reply Brief is that the
district court was correct in concluding that the case was over-litigated. Appellant Reply Br. at
20. Specifically, Investor Recovery relies on the district court's conclusion that "a case that was
days away from trial before current counsel's involvement required nearly as many fees and
costs to prepare for trial as all the fees incurred by prior counsel combined." Appellant's Reply
Br. at 20 (citing CR at 3876-78). Literally on the basis of that single sentence, the district court
seemingly did not allow the Hopkins Associates to recover any of their fees, totaling
approximately $400,000, for the work that "current counsel" -Holland & Hart-performed
between the time it entered in the case in January 2018 through the commencement of trial on
June 4, 2018. Id.; CR 30.
Notwithstanding Investor Recovery's arguments, the district court's statement constituted
an abuse of discretion, for three obvious reasons.
First, prior to the involvement of current counsel, no attorney in the case had identified
the dispute as one involving holder claims. As the Hopkins Associates argued in their CrossAppellants' Brief at 57, the Hopkins Associates believe that their counsel's application of the
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holder claim jurisprudence to this case was of substantial value even though the district court
failed to recognize that value. If this Court were to agree that the dozens of reported opinions
from all over the country addressing this very same fact pattern, Cross-Appellants' Brief at 2732, are on point, instructive and could have or should have resulted in a dismissal of Investor
Recovery's claims well in advance of trial, 3 then the district court's characterization of those
efforts as over-lawyering was incorrect. It was an abuse of the district court's discretion to deny
the Hopkins Associates any fees for that effort.
Second, Holland & Hart filed a motion to disqualify Investor Recovery's expert witness
Raymond Klein, which the district court granted. CR 2885-3026, 3071-3080, TT 121-25. That
represented a significant victory that may well have contributed to the directed verdict. It was an
abuse of the district court's discretion to essentially deny the Hopkins Associates any fees for
that effort.
Third, the district court eschewed any detailed consideration of more than 1,000 hours of
work underlying a $400,000 fee claim by concluding on the basis of a few words that the work
was duplicative. That unsupported conclusion constituted an abuse of discretion. The Court
casually held that the case was over-lawyered to the tune of $400,000, but it actually only
identified 15 hours (about $5,000 in time) that it regarded as questionable. CR 3877-3878.

III.

CONCLUSION

This Court should affirm the district court's granting of Randy and Brian's motion for a
directed verdict. This Court should affirm the district court's granting of the summary judgment
motion of Hopkins Financial.

3

Randy and Brian's motion for summary judgment and on the basis of the holder claim case law,
and supporting materials, are found in the record at CR 2336-2742, 2864-2884.
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This Court should vacate the district court's rulings on Hopkins Associates' motion for
attorney's fees and costs incurred in the district court. It should remand the attorney fee motion
to the district court, for proceedings consistent with its opinion that all fees in this lawsuit are
entitled to recovery under § 12-120(3). It should remand to the district court a determination of
the amount of the fees that would be reasonable.
This Court should hold that Hopkins Associates are entitled to recover their attorney's
fees and costs incurred in this appeal.
DATED this 14th day of January, 2020.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

By Isl Robert A. Faucher
Robert A. Faucher, of the firm
Sara M. Berry, for the firm
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents-CrossAppellants
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